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Judicial Discipline-Does It Exist in
Pennsylvania?
I.

Introduction

Public confidence in the integrity of the courts is essential to an
effective judicial system.' The basis of much of this confidence is the
belief that the judges within that system are competent, independent,
and of impeccable character. 2 To many people in the general community, the judge is the "personal embodiment of the American
ideal of justice." 3 Although the great majority of judges conduct
themselves in a manner consistent with this ideal, some incidents of
judicial misconduct' do occur.' Historically, a variety of procedures
have been utilized to discipline judges for their misconduct to assure
the community that their trust in the judiciary is warranted.6
Unfortunately, the faith of the American public in its system of
justice has been seriously undermined in recent years,7 and these
traditional methods of discipline have proven inadequate to prevent
this erosion of confidence.' To combat growing public disillusion1. In re Emmett, 293 Ala. 143, 147 So. 2d 435 (1974).
2. Preface to THE JUDICIARY, REFERENCE MANUAL No.

5, THE PA. CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION at vii (1968) [hereinafter cited as THE JUDICIARY].

3. In re Greenberg, 442 Pa. 411, 419, 280 A.2d 370, 373 (1971).
4. As used in this comment, "judicial misconduct" refers to any conduct of a judge that
may necessitate disciplinary action under the applicable statutory and constitutional provisions.
5.

See, e.g., W. BRAITHWAITE, WHO JUDGES THE JUDGES? 3-11 (1971).

6. See generally Schoenberg, 4 HistoricalLook at JudicialDiscipline,54 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1 (1977).
7. Public confidence in the judiciary is dependent upon a number of considerations.
These include (1) the non-judicial activities of judges; (2) the efficiency of the procedural operation of the courts; (3) the competence of judges to handle complex social problems; (4) the
ability of an adversary system to provide equal justice to all litigants; and (5) public conceptions of the nature of the judicial process. See Miller, Public Confidencein the Judiciary.-Some
Notes and Ref§ections, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 69 (1970).
The recent decline of public confidence in the judiciary has been linked to several factors,
including the non-judicial activities of Justice Fortas and Judges Carswell and Haynesworth,
revealed in the Senate hearings on their nominations to the Supreme Court, and the public
outcry for the impeachment of Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren, see, e.g., McKay,
The Judiciary and Non-yudicial Activities, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 9, 9-10 (1970); the
severe overcrowding of court dockets and subsequent delay in courtroom proceedings, see
Tramm, Are Courts Going the Way ofthe Dinosaur, 57 A.B.A.J. 229 (1971); and the belief that
the courts are discriminatory and favor the criminal defendant, see Miller, supra at 87-92;
Miller, Some Pervasive Myths About the United States Supreme Court, 10 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 153
(1965).
8. See notes 18-38 and accompanying text infra

ment in the judiciary, many states have adopted a new mechanism,
the judicial disciplinary commission, which investigates complaints
of judicial misconduct and recommends the appropriate disciplinary
action, when necessary, to the state supreme court. 9 Pennsylvania
established such a disciplinary commission, the Judicial Inquiry and
Review Board (JIRB),10 pursuant to a constitutional amendment
adopted in 1968."
Although the ultimate purpose of the disciplinary commission is
the promotion of public confidence in the judiciary, 2 it serves three
additional purposes. The commission increases the awareness of the
judicial community of the consequences of violating the standards
governing judicial conduct.' 3 By refining the definitions of acceptable judicial conduct through a case-by-case determination, the com9. Most state disciplinary commissions are modeled after the plan first implemented in
California in 1960. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 8. The California Commission is composed of five
judges, appointed by the state supreme court; two lawyers, appointed by the state bar association; and two laypersons, appointed by the Governor. The Commission receives complaints of
judicial misconduct, and investigates and prosecutes those that appear to be valid. The Commission may either admonish a judge privately or recommend disciplinary action to the
supreme court. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 17 provides as follows:
(c) On recommendation of the [Commission], the supreme court may (1) retire a
judge for a disability that seriously interferes with the performance of a judge's duty
and is or is likely to become permanent and (2) censure or remove a judge for action
. . . that constitutes wilful misconduct in office, persistent failure or inability to perform the judge's duties, habitual intemperance in the use of intoxicants or drugs, or
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute ....
It was not until thirteen years after the creation of the California Commission
that it removed a judge from office by action of the supreme court. The Commission,
however, has been very successful in obtaining results indirectly because many judges
voluntarily resign upon the initiation of proceedings against them.
For further discussion of the California system, see Burke, The California Story,
48 J. AM. JUD. SoC. 167 (1965); Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an
Old Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 166 (1963); Comment, State JudicialDiscplinaryCommissions and Proceedings: Developing Administrative and Legal Standards/orEvaluating
JudicialMisconduct, 10 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 685, 686-89 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Developing Standards]; Note, JudicialDisciplinein Calfornia:.A CriticalEvaluation, 10
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 192 (1976).
10. Hereinafter referred to as the JIRB.
11. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18. At least thirty other states and the District of Columbia have
adopted a similar plan. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, §§ 6.17-.18; ALAS. CONST. art. IV, § 10;
ARtz. CONST. art. 6.1, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 12; GA. CONST.
§ 2-4203, art. VI, § XIII; HAW. REV. STAT. tit. 32, § 610-11 (1976); IND. CONST. art. 7, § 9;
IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 19; KAN. SUP. CT. R. 602; LA. CONST. art. 5, § 24; MD. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4A; MxCH. CONST. art. VI, § 30; Mo. CONST. art. V, § 27; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 11, NEB.
CONST. art. 5, § 24; N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 22; N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-375 (1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2701-11 (Page Supp. 1978); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 1.410 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); S.C. SuP. CT. R. 34, § 3; S.D.
CONST. art. V, § 9; TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-308 (Cum. Supp. 1978); TEX. CONST. art. V, § I-a;
VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10; RULES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WIS. CODE OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS, 52 Wis. 2d vii (1971); Wyo. CONST. art. V, § 6; D.C. CODE § 11-1529(a) (1973). Some
of these jurisdictions have modified the "California" structure in an attempt to increase the
commission's efficiency. See notes 136-64 and accompanying text in/ra
12. See, e.g., Braithwaite, JudicialMisconduct and How Four States Deal With It, 35 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 151, 153 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Four States]; Comment, The Procedures of JudicialDiscopline, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 190, 209-11 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Procedures].
13. See, e.g., Greenberg, The Task of Judging the Judges, 59 JUD. 459, 464 (1976).

mission informs judges of what is expected of them in specific
situations.' 4 As a result, the disciplinary commission is intended to
deter future judicial misconduct.' 5
The disciplinary commission as implemented in Pennsylvania,
however, has not proven completely effective in serving these purposes of judicial discipline. The causes of the inadequacy of the6
JIRB as a disciplinary mechanism are the focus of this comment.'
First, consideration is given to the historical reasons underlying the
creation of the JIRB, its structure, and the procedure that it employs.
Second, the disciplinary actions initiated by the JIRB are analyzed.
Finally, suggestions are made for procedural and substantive
changes,
the adoption of which may increase the effectiveness of the
7

JIRB.

t

II.

Methods of Judicial Discipline in Pennsylvania

A.

TraditionalMethods

Before 1968, only three procedures for disciplining judges were
available in Pennsylvania.'I The first of these, impeachment, ' al14. See, e.g., id. at 464-65; Note, Remediesfor Judicial Misconduct and Disability. Removal and Disciplineo/Judges,41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 149, 195 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Remediesfor Misconduct].
15. See, e.g., Frankel, Judicial Discipline and Removal, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1131
(1966); Greenberg, supra note 13, at 465-566.
16. For a general discussion of the operation of commissions similar to that of Pennsylvania, see Gillis and Fieldinan, Michigan's UnitarySystem ofJudicialDisciline. A Comparison with Illinois Two-Tier Approach, 54 CHr.-KENT L. REV. 117 (1977); Comment, Selection
and Discipline of State Judges in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 672 (1973); Note, The Commission
Removal Plan. A Corrective Remedyfor Judicial Removal in Iowa, 55 IowA L. REV. 1020
(1970); Note, DisciplineofJudges inlMaryland,34 MD. L. REV. 612 (1974); Note, JudicialDiscipline - The North CarolinaSystem, 54 N.C. L. REV. 1074 (1976).
17. At present, the only means of disciplining judges in the federal court system is
through the impeachment process. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.3. Although proposals for alternative disciplinary mechanisms have been introduced into Congress none have yet been accepted. The Supreme Court in Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74
(1970), presented opposing views on the constitutionality and necessity of implementing a new
disciplinary procedure within the federal judiciary. See also JudicialTenure Act: Hearingson
S. 1110 Be/ore the Subcomm. on Improvements in the JudicialMachineryofthe Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976); The JudicialReform Act. Hearingson S. 1506
and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate
Comm on the Judiciary,91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969); JudicialFitness: Hearingson Procedures
for the Removal, Retirement, and Discipliningof Unfit JudgesBeore the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1966); Shartel, Federal Judges - Appointment, Supervision and Removal - Some Possibilities
Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 723 (1930); Comment, The Limitations ofArticle III
on the ProposedJudicialRemoval Machinery: S. 1506, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1064 (1970).
18. Recall, a fourth traditional method of disciplining the judiciary is presently used in
only three states. See Ariz. CONST. art. 8, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. 23, § 1; WIs. CONST. art. 13,
§ 12. Through this process, a judge may be removed from office through a special election
requested in a petition signed by a specified percentage of voters. Although this procedure
presents the public with a direct means of disciplining judges, the voters will usually be motivated to do so only for the most flagrant types of misconduct. In addition, gathering the required number of signatures can be a very expensive process. See, Schoenberg, supra note 6,
at 8-9; Remediesfor Misconduct,supra note 14, at 164-65. Although recall has been used very
rarely in judicial disciplinary actions, a Wisconsin judge was removed from office through this

lows the removal of a judge upon a finding of "misbehavior in office." 2 Prosecution of a judge on these grounds is initiated by the
House of Representatives, whose function in the process is similar to

that of a grand jury in a criminal prosecution.21 The judge is then
22

tried before the Senate upon the formal charges filed by the House.
Because this process requires the participation of the legislature acting as a judicial body, impeachment possesses an inherent potential
for political abuse by this partisan group.2 3 In addition, judicial
25
24
commentators consider impeachment to be ineffective, expensive
and to require time and skills beyond that which the legislature may
be able to afford the process. 26 Perhaps as a result of these procedural encumbrances, only seven judges have been impeached in Pennsylvania, the last of these in 181 1.27
Address, the second disciplinary procedure, permits removal of
a judge by the Governor upon the presentation of a resolution formally requesting such action by one or both houses of the legislature.2 8 Judges may be disciplined through this procedure on the
grounds of "reasonable cause. ' ' 29 Because address also requires legislative action, its use has been hampered by the same problems evident in the impeachment process. 30 It is not surprising, therefore,
that address has been utilized in an even smaller number of judicial
procedure in 1977. The voters requested the recall election after the judge allegedly told a rape
victim that she should have expected the attack as a normal reaction to her mode of dressing.
Chicago Tribune, Sept. 8, 1977, § 1,at 1,col. 2.
19. PA. CONST.art. 6, § 6.
20. Id This term has never been adequately defined by either the legislature or the
courts. In dictum, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the term means "a criminal act
in the course of the conduct of the office, to which impeachments are limited. For crimes not
[misbehavior] in office, impeachment cannot be brought." In re Dauphin County Grand Jury
Investigation Proceeding, 332 Pa. 342, 345, 2 A.2d 802,-803 (1938). The Pennsylvania Superior
Court has declared the term to mean "either the breach of a positive statutory duty or the
performance by a public official of a discretionary act with an improper or corrupt motive."
Commonwealth v. Green, 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 539, 546, 211 A.2d 5, 9 (1965). The ambiguity of
the grounds for impeachment continue to be an obstacle to the effective utilization of this
remedy. See THE JuDiciARY, supra note 2, at 160-61.
21. PA. CONST. art. 6, § 4.
22. Id § 5.
23. See Schoenberg, supra note 6, at 6-7.
24. See, e.g., BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 12-13; PROCEDURES, suPRA note 12, at 196.
25. For example, the costs of impeachment in Florida totalled $121,869.11 for one proceeding in 1957 and $114,742.93 for another in 1963. Braithwaite, Removal and Retirement of
Judges in Mirsouri-A Field Study, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 378, 430. See also FourStates, supra
note 12, at 155.
26.

THE JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 160-61.

27. Id. at 154.
28. PA. CONST.art. 6, § 7.
29. Id The grounds for address are considered broader than those for impeachment,
since they do not exclude any conduct that may be an impeachable offense. THE JUDICIARY,
supra note 2, at 165. Pennsylvania cases have not defined the term "reasonable cause." Indication of the meaning of the term is found in dictum of the supreme court which declared that
"[any judge who either by his 'sale,' his 'denial,' or his 'delay' ofjustice destroys or prejudices
a suitor's rights subjects himself to removal from office through [address]." Commonwealth ex
rel. Duff v. Keenan, 347 Pa. 574, 583, 33 A.2d 244, 249 (1943).
30. But see Shipley, Legislative Control of Judicial Behavior, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP.

disciplinary actions in Pennsylvania than impeachment. 3 '
Removal for "conviction of misbehavior in office or for an infamous crime"3 2 is the final traditional mechanism used to punish judicial misconduct.3 3 This method, used only once in Pennsylvania
against a member of the judiciary, is considered self-executing; removal is automatic upon conviction of the named offenses.3 4 The
limited grounds for this type of removal restrict its effectiveness in
judicial matters, however, for only a small portion of judicial misconduct is criminal in nature.3 5
In addition to the specific criticisms leveled against each of these
procedures, three other factors contribute to their general inadequacy. First, all of these methods mandate the use of only one sanction; the judge in question is either removed entirely or he is not
punished at all. Most judicial misconduct, however, is of a type warranting some lesser disciplinary measure.3 6 Second, the grounds
PROB. 178 (1970)(a favorable discussion of the effectiveness of legislative disciplinary actions
against the federal judiciary).
31. THE JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 164.
32. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 7.
33. Some commentators also consider removal by popular election to be a judicial disciplinary mechanism since citizens who are not satisfied with a judge's conduct will not vote to
retain him in office. Article 5, section 13 of the Pennsylvania constitution provides for selection of judges through an election. When determining the adequacy of this process as a disciplinary measure, however, one must first consider the overall effectiveness of the electoral
process as a means of choosing qualified judges. Requiring individuals to run for judicial
office introduces undesirable political influences into the operations of the courts. Voters may
choose judges on the basis of their political affiliations rather than their professional qualifications. Thus, a good judge may be-removed from office through the electoral process while an
incompetent judge retains this position. See generaly Schoenberg, supra note 6, at 9-10.
To avoid this problem, many states have adopted a nonpartisan system of judicial selection, commonly known as the Missouri plan, whereby judges are chosen on the merits of their
professional abilities. A nominating commission screens eligible candidates and recommends
qualified individuals to the Governor, who then appoints one to the judicial office for a limited
period of time. At the end of this time the judge stands for a retention election in which he
runs upon the merits of his record in office.
By removing partisan influences from the selection of a state's judicial officers, proponents
of the Missouri plan hoped to effectuate the selection of a more highly qualified and ethical
judiciary. Limited surveys of those states which have adopted the plan, however, indicate only
a minimal difference in the quality and performance of the judiciary resulting from a system of
merit selection versus an electoral process. See generaly Glick, The Promiseand the Performance ofthe MissouriPlan: JudicialSelection in the 50 States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509 (1978).
See also Adamary and Dubois, Electing State Judges, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 731; Alfini, Trend
kL'Ln
Toward JudicialMerit Selection, 13 TRIAL 40 (1977); Jenkins, Retention Elections.- Who

When No One Loses, 61 JUD. 79 (1977).
34. Commonwealth v. Knox, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 510, 94 A.2d 138 (1953), afd, 374 Pa.
343, 97 A.2d 782 (1953). The magistrate in this case was removed from office for his violation
of the bail provisions of the Magistrate's Court Act of 1937. The supreme court stated that this
action was a failure to perform a positive statutory duty and therefore constituted misbehavior
in office. The court in Knox did not, however, construe the phrase "infamous crime." This
term has been defined in one old case, involving a non-judicial public official, to include offenses which "involve the charge of falsehood and affect the public administration of justice."
Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 Watts & Serg. 338 (Pa. 1842).
35. Frankel, Who Judges the dudges 11 TRIAL 52 (1975); Overton, Groundsfor Judicial
Discplinein the Context of JudicialDisciplnaryCommions, 54 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 59, 61-62
(1977).
36. Frankel, supra note 35, at 53.

upon which all of these processes may be initiated still cover only a
small portion of the actual range of judicial misconduct.3 7 Finally,
any increased use of these traditional disciplinary measures or an
expansion of the grounds upon which ty can be initiated, to meet
present instances of judicial misconduct, may result in an undesirable chilling of judicial independence. Fearing that disciplinary actions might be initiated by the legislature, judges may be improperly
influenced by political pressures when deciding unpopular issues.38
B. JudicialInquiry and Review Board
By establishing the JIRB, the delegates to the 1969 constitutional convention hoped to avoid many of the problems inherent in
the traditional disciplinary procedures. Existing independently of
the legislature, the JIRB is composed of nine members - five judges,
two lawyers, and two laypersons, all of whom are appointed for four
year terms. 39 The judicial members, who must hold office in different judicial districts, are selected by the supreme court. 4° The nonjudicial members are appointed by the Governor. 4
Complaints about judicial misconduct may be taken by the
JIRB from any source.4 2 Upon receipt of a complaint alleging facts
that seem to indicate a violation of the applicable constitutional provisions,4 3 the Board will conduct a preliminary investigation of the
charges." If, after the completion of this investigation, the JIRB
feels the complaint of misconduct is legitimate, it will then institute a
formal hearing upon the matter.45 At this time, the judge is notified
37. See generally Frankel, JudicialDiscpline and Removal, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 112224; Overton, supra note 35; 84 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1007-08 (1971).
38. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra.
39. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18(a).
40. Id
41. Id
42.

PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18(c).

43. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
44. Pennsylvania Rules of Procedure for the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board I [hereinafter cited as PA. R. P. J.I.R.B.].
45. PA. R. P. J.I.R.B. 2, 4, 5, 6.
This merger of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions in the JIRB was
unsuccessfully challenged on constitutional grounds in Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) and Roy v. Jones, 349 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Pa. 1972). The plaintiffs in both these
cases claimed that the merger of these functions prevented an impartial hearing and was a
denial of procedural due process. This theory was rejected on two grounds. First, relying on
earlier cases which held that this merger within an administrative agency was not a per se
violation of due process, see, e.g., Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1974); Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Belizaro v. Zimmerman, 200 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1952), the courts
ruled that the judge must present evidence of actual bias within the JIRB before its impartiality would be questioned. 332 F. Supp. at 618-19; 349 F. Supp. at 321. Accord, Hallick v.
Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977); In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alas. 1975); In re
Deiner, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); In re Nowell, 293
N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977). Furthermore, since the JIRB merely recommends disciplinary action, and leaves the final resolution of the matter to the supreme court, the courts held
that a separation of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions existed at the most important
level of the trial. 332 F. Supp. at 618; 349 F. Supp. at 322. Accord, In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198,

of the nature of the charges against him and the name of the individual who filed the complaint.' At the formal hearing the judge has
the right to be represented by counsel, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to present evidence upon his behalf.4 7 At the conclusion of this hearing, if the JIRB feels there exists good cause to discipline the judge, it will recommend the appropriate sanction to the
supreme court.48
The supreme court will review the record of the JIRB's proceedings on the law and facts.49 It may also consider additional evidence
introduced by either the JIRB or the judge.5 ° The court is not bound
by the recommendation of the JIRB and may either accept, modify,
or reject it completely. 5 ' The decision of the court on the JIRB's
542 P.2d 676 (1975); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246 (1977); In re Brown, 512

S.W.2d 317 (Tex. 1974).
46. PA. R. P. J.I.R.B. 20 provides "All papers filed with and proceedings before the
Board shall be confidential until a record is filed by the Board in the Supreme Court. Confidentiality at the investigative level of the JIRB's proceedings is extremely important." Confidentiality encourages individuals to report judicial misconduct, ridding the complainant of the
fear of judicial recriminations for filing the complaint. The reputation of the judge is also
protected by preventing the public disclosure of charges that may be revealed subsequently in
the preliminary investigation to have no reasonable basis.
Once the JIRB has determined that probable cause for disciplinary action does exist, however, the hearing should then be public. This hearing would reinforce the credibility of the
JIRB as a viable disciplinary mechanism by insuring the public's knowledge of the procedure
and thereby avoiding the appearance of a "white-washing" of judicial misconduct. See
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 834-37 (1978); Todd and Proctor,
Burden of Proof Sanctions,and Confidentialiy, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 189-99 (1977).
The American Bar Association has drafted an extensive model procedure to maintain
confidentiality until a finding of probable cause for disciplinary action is reached. See ABA
PROPOSED STANDARDS RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIREMENT

Nos. 4.1-4.13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED STANDARDS].
47. In Keiser v. Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971), the district court held that a judge
was not entitled to a jury trial before either the JIRB or the supreme court. Defining these
proceedings to be merely a determination of judicial fitness, and not criminal guilt, the court
did not consider it necessary that a judge be afforded all the constitutional rights guaranteed to
a criminal defendant. Accord, In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
962 (1970); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re Mikesell, 369 Mich. 517, 243
N.w.2d 86 (1976); In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975). See also Developing
Standards, supra note 9, at 693-94.
48. Under PA. R. P. J.I.R.B. 14, the JIRB may recommend the following sanctions: suspension; removal; discipline; or compulsory retirement. For a general discussion of the types
of conduct which warrant a particular sanction, see Developing Standards, supra note 9, at 70004. See also ABA PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 46, Nos. 6. 1-6.7; Todd and Proctor,
supra note 46, at 183-89.
PA. R. P. J.I.R.B. 13 provides that the judge be afforded a reasonable opportunity for a
second hearing to present additional evidence before the JIRB submits its recommendation to
the supreme court.
49.. PA. R. P. J.I.R.B. 18.
In the review of the record of the commission's proceeding, the standard of review for the
state supreme court has been defined as an independent evaluation of the evidence. See, e.g.,
Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 204
(1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1971); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970). See
also, Developing Standards, supra note 9, at 696-97.
50. Id
51. PA. R. P. J.I.R.B. 18. Rule 18 also allows the court to remand the matter to the JIRB
for further proceedings at that level.

recommendation is then final.52
The grounds upon which the JIRB may initiate disciplinary
proceedings are much broader then those which would justify the
use of traditional disciplinary processes.53 The Pennsylvania constitution provides that judges will be subject to disciplinary action for
violation of section seventeen of this article, misconduct in office,
neglect of duty, failure to perform his duty or conduct which
prejudices the administration of justice and brings the judicial office into disrepute ...."
Article 5, section 17 of the constitution outlines the activities prohibited for the judiciary and includes, among other conduct, the violation of "any canon of legal or judicial ethics prescribed by the
[slupreme [c]ourt."' 5 The supreme court has adopted the American
Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct5 6 and has thereby incorporated the violation of the Code into the grounds for judicial discipline through the JIRB.5 7
Under the procedures outlined above, Pennsylvania has placed
into the hands of the judiciary the mechanism for disciplining all
judges and justices within the state's court system.5 8 The final re52. For a thorough discussion of the model procedure for the disciplinary commission in
general, see ABA PROPOSED STANDARDS, supra note 46, Nos. 1.1-9.4. See also Peskoe, Proceduresfor JudicialDiscipline. Type of Commission, Due Process,and Right to Counsel 54 CHI.KENT L. REV. 147 (1977).
53. See notes 20, 29 and 34 supra.
54. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 18(d). These statutory standards were challenged in Keiser v.
Bell, 332 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1971), as impermissibly vague and overbroad, a claim that was
held to be without merit by the district court. Although recognizing that the terms were somewhat indefinite when standing alone, the court posited that the charges enumerated in the
complaint provided all the additional definition necessary to meet due process requirements.
The court noted that clarification of the standards was also possible from the Code of Judicial
Conduct and the "general moral and ethical standards expected of judicial officers by the
community." Id at 615. Accord, Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977);
Sarisohn v. Appellate Div., 265 F. Supp. 455 (D.C.N.Y. 1967); In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 318
A.2d 523 (1974); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d 246; In re Bates, 555 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
1977).
55. PA.CONST. art. 5, § 17(b). Article 5, § 17 also provides the following:
Justices and judges shall devote full time to their judicial duties and shall not engage
in the practice of law, hold office in a political party or political organization, or hold
an office or position of profit in the government of the United States, the Commonwealth or any municipal corporation or political subdivision thereof, except in the
military service of the United States or the Commonwealth.
56. 455 Pa. xxix (1963) [hereinafter referred to as the Code].
57. The Code superseded the ABA's Canons of Judicial Ethics drafted in 1936. The
Canons had been criticized as too ambiguous and hortatory to provide any meaningful guidelines for judges attempting to evaluate the propriety of their conduct. The Code establishes
more compact standards, designed to assist the judiciary in establishing the boundaries of acceptable judicial, extra-judicial, and nonjudicial behavior. See generally Kaufman, Lions or
Jackals.-The Function of a Code of JudicialEthics, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1970);
Thode, The Development of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 793 (1972);
Comment, A DisciplinedApproach to JudicialDiscipline, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 503, 511-521
(1978). Nearly every jurisdiction has adopted the Code or integrated parts of it into existing
state codes of ethics. For a report on the application and interpretation of the Code in these
jurisdictions, see Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct - The FirstFive Years in Court, 1977
UTAH L. Rav. 395.
58. PA. R. P. J.I.R.B. 19 provides:

sponsibility for determining the need for the application of a sanction upon a particular judge ultimately rests with the supreme
court. 9 The court has complete discretion to define
the boundaries
60

of acceptable judicial conduct in Pennsylvania.

The present system has two advantages over more traditional
methods of judicial discipline. First, the independence of the judiciary is maintained without sacrificing its integrity. The independence
of the judiciary is considered vital to a court's ability to enforce unpopular but necessary decisions and to protect the rights of minorities. 6 1 The use of a disciplinary commission protects the judiciary
from interference by either the legislative or executive branch of
government.6 2 In addition, the commission protects the individual
judge from arbitrary political reprisals for his unpopular decisions.
The fear of such reprisals may intimidate a judge when deciding
63
cases, and thereby impede progressive judicial development.
While remaining independent, however, the conduct of the judiciary
is kept within acceptable boundaries by the standards imposed
through disciplinary proceedings.
Second, because the misconduct of one judge can reflect negatively upon the judiciary as a whole, judges are the individuals most
concerned with protecting the integrity of the judiciary.' For this
A judge who is a member of the Board or of the supreme court may not participate as
such in any proceedings involving his own suspension, removal, discipline or compulsory retirement.
59. In addition to this responsibility as expressly provided in section 18 of the Pennsylvania constitution, the highest court of any jurisdiction is generally recognized to possess an
inherent power, implied from the time of the court's creation, to supervise the inferior tribunals within that court system. The scope of this supervision encompasses the exercise of any
power that may be essential for the efficient performance of the judiciary. See generally Cameron, The Inherent Power ofa State's Highest Court to Discilinethe Judiciary,54 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 45 (1977).
The inherent power of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is preserved by Article 5, section
10(a), which expressly reserves to the supreme court the power to superintend the lower judiciary. See Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 99-100, 61 A.2d 426, 428-39
(1948); THE JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 167-71. Included within the scope of the supreme
court's inherent supervisory power is the ability to discipline judicial misconduct, a power that
is not diminished by the creation of the JIRB. See In re Franciscus, 471 Pa. 53, 369 A.2d 1190
(1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 870 (1977); In re Petition of Squires and Constables Ass'n of Pa.,
Inc., 442 Pa. 502, 275 A.2d 657 (1971).
60. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
matters involving the Code of Judicial Conduct. Reed v. Sloan, 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 570, 576,
360 A.2d 767, 770 (1976), aft'd,475 Pa. 570, 381 A.2d 421 (1977).
61. See Kaufman, Chilling JudicialIndependence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 681-90 (1978).
62. See generally Ervin, SeparationofPowers: JudicialIndependence, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 108 (1970).

63. See Comment, JudicialDiscpline, Removal and Retirement, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 563,
582; Removal and Discpline, supra note 14, at 150. But see Comment, Towards a Disciplined
Approach to JudicialDisciline, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 503, 508-11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
DirciplinedApproach](the failure, at present, to clearly define the grounds upon which a commission may initiate disciplinary actions results in a similar type of judicial uncertainty).
64. This theory has been expressed by one commentator as follows:
That some judges - however few in number is beside the point, for even one rotten
judicial apple can go far toward spoiling the entire judicial barrel - fall short of the

reason, they will attempt to utilize the disciplinary commission in the
most effective way for the maintenance of the highest standards of
judicial ethics possible.65
III.

Legal Principles of Judicial Discipline

Several general principles have been developed by the court in
those states which employ a disciplinary commission similar to the
JIRB.66 The courts have declared that the primary purpose of judicial discipline is not the punishment of a particular judge for his
misconduct.6 7 Instead, a disciplinary commission is established to
encourage public respect for the judicial process by maintaining the
integrity and efficiency of the judiciary.6 8 For this reason, the public's perception of judicial conduct is the determinative factor influencing the commissions' decisions to impose sanctions.
The evidence of judicial misconduct must be considered according to the standard of an objective private citizen.6 9 Evaluation of
the evidence by this standard does not require that an individual
citizen have a thorough knowledge of either the details of the alleged
misconduct or judicial proceedings. Generally, under this standard,
if there is some possibility that the "average" citizen might consider
the judge's behavior to be improper or to give the appearances of
impropriety, disciplinary action is required.7"
requisite standards of integrity and propriety creates a large part of the problem of
public confidence.
Miller, supra note 7, at 70.
65. See Clark, Judicial Sedf-Regulation. Its Potential, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 37
(1970); Schoenberg, supra note 6, at 19. But if. Kaufman, supra note 57, at 710-16 (judicial
self regulation infringes upon judicial independence because it divides the judicial community).
66. See note 11 supra.
67. See, e.g., In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1970); In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d
676 (1975); In re Deiner, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied,415 U.S. 989 (1974);
In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1976); In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978);
In re Edens, 290 N.C. 299, 226 S.E.2d 5 (1976); In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. 1974).
68. Id
69. See, e.g., In re Lamotte, 341 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1977), in which the court stated the
following:
In determining whether a judge has conducted himself in a manner which erodes
public confidence in the judiciary, we must consider the act of wrong itself and not
the resulting adverse publicity. Otherwise an unpopular, but correct, decision of a
judge could be construed as eroding public confidence in the judiciary. On the other
thejudicihand, if a judge commits a grievous wrong which should erode confidence in he
should
ary, but it does not appearthat thepublic has lost confidence in the judiciary,
nonetheless be removed (emphasis added).
Id at 517. See also In re Foster, 271 Md. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974) in which the court, emphasizing the "average person," held that
[t]he test [for the appearance of impropriety] is... whether a reasonableman would
be justified in suspecting that the result ... was achieved because of [Judge Foster's]
position and prestige. (emphasis added).
Id at 453, 533.
70. Most courts emphasize the objective but average citizen. See, e.g., Geiler v. Comm'n
on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973); In re Dekle,
308 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1975); In re Larkin, 368 Mass. 87, 333 N.E.2d 199 (1975); In re Storie, 574

Most jurisdictions also agree that judges must adhere to standards of conduct that are more demanding than those applied to the
majority of society7 and which extend to all aspects of a judge's
professional and private life.72 The courts do not require that a
judge possess bad faith,7 3 evil intent,7 4 or a desire for personal benefit 75 for his actions to constitute misconduct. The burden of proving
misconduct rests with the commission, 76 however, and must be satisfied by clear and convincing evidence.77
Despite the delineation of these guiding principles, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decisions in cases of judicial discipline
have been riddled with inconsistencies, conflicts, and contradictions.
In the process, the court has often overlooked the original purpose
for which the JIRB was created.
IV.

Pennsylvania Cases on Judicial Discipline

Initially, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the courts in most other jurisdictions when it considered the
S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978); In re Vaccaro, 42 N.Y.2d (e) (1977); In re Stuhl, 292 N.C. 379, 233
S.E.2d 562 (1977). Some judicial analysts have questioned the validity of holding the view of
this individual to be representative of the general public. In the opinion of one such analyst,
society is actually composed of a number of publics and the basic societal unit is the pluralistic
social group, not the individual. Therefore, the court in judicial disciplinary actions should
attempt to evaluate public confidence through a consideration of "(a) which groups (or leaders
thereof) hold (b) how much esteem (or respect) for (c) the courts . . .through (d) selected
periods of time." See Miller, supra note 7, at 73. See also DisciplinedApproach,supra note 63,
at 514-17; Remedies for Misconduct, supra note 14, at 125.
71. Judges play a unique and powerful role in society, and courts consider this factor to
be sufficient justification for scrutinizing their conduct under more demanding standards of
conduct. See, e.g., In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 676 (1975); In re Bonin, __ Mass.
378 N.E.2d 669 (1978); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477
(1972); In re Douglas, 135 Vt. 585, 382 A.2d 215 (1977). See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 9;
Miller, supra note 7, at 70-72.
72. See, e.g., In re Emmett, 293 Ala. 143, 149, 300 So. 2d 435, 538 (1974). "A judge
should not engage in any conduct in private or public which would bring about disrespect to
him or the high office he holds." Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 370,
515 P.2d i, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); In re Inquiry Concerning Conduct of Judges' Spouses, 336 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1976); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So.
2d 469 (1970); In re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 267 N.W.2d 914 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110
Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), ceri. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237 S.E.2d
246 (1977); In re Douglas, 135 Vt. 585, 382 A.2d 215 (1977).
74. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); In re Larkin, 368 Mass. 87, 333
N.E.2d 199 (1975); In re Kohn, 568 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1978); In re Nowell, 293 N.C. 235, 237
S.E.2d 246 (1977).
75. See, e.g., In re Deiner, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied 415 U.S. 989
(1974); In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978); In re Spitalnick, 63 N.J. 429, 308 A.2d 1
(1973); In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975).
76. The burden of proof is generally placed upon the party who desires to change the
present state of affairs. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 355 (2d ed.
1972).
77. See, e.g., In re Emmett, 293 Ala. 143, 300 So. 2d 435 (1974); In re Hanson, 532 P.2d
303 (Alas. 1975); In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 676 (1975); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1,
241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re Henerman, - S.D. _ 240 N.W.2d 603 (1976). See Todd and
Proctor, supra note 46, at 178-83.

78
first recommendations of the JIRB. In re Greenberg
concerned a
common pleas judge who had been found guilty on criminal charges
of mail fraud. The fraud itself had occurred over a four year period
immediately prior to the judge's appointment to the bench, but the
subsequent trial and conviction took place five years after this appointment. The JIRB unanimously recommended suspension of the
judge, pending appellate review of the criminal conviction, on the
grounds that the conviction constituted "conduct which prejudices
the proper administration of justice and brings the judicial office into
disrepute." 79
The court accepted the JIRB's recommendation and established
two significant precedents for judicial discipline in Pennsylvania. By
suspending a judge for actions taken before he ascended to the
bench,"° the court indicated that the scope of inquiry in disciplinary
proceedings would include all conduct of a judge. The alleged misconduct need not occur while the individual is acting in his official
capacity nor need it directly interfere with the judge's ability to decide cases properly.
The court applied the objective standard of review to the evidence of judicial misconduct. The court considered it irrelevant to
the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding that the judge's service
record was outstanding or that his reputation was that of a highly
competent and efficient judge."' Although these characteristics were
apparent to the judge's peers and employees, certain segments of the
community would be aware only of his criminal conviction. Given
this possibility and the likelihood that this knowledge would weaken
the public's faith in the impartiality and integrity of criminal court
proceedings, the court considered suspension, with removal pending
a final criminal appeal, necessary to fulfill the primary purpose of

78. 442 Pa. 411, 280 A.2d 370 (1971).
79. The disciplinary sanction imposed upon a judge for criminal misconduct should be
considered a "collateral consequence of the finding of criminal guilt" similar to the loss of
voting rights while imprisoned. Hall, Judicial Removalfor Off-Bench Behavior. hy, 21 J.
PUB. L. 127, 142 (1972). Conviction should not be necessary before imposition of discipline is
possible, however, since public confidence is especially weakened by this type of judicial misconduct. A judge's alleged participation in some criminal activity would indicate noncompliance with the very laws under which he may impose criminal liabilities upon others. See In re
Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970) (judge removed from office, despite acquittal of
criminal charges filed against him, partly because of participation in illegal "stag party"). See
In re Carillo, 542 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1976) (judge removed from office for cheating county of
goods, services, and money). See also Overton, supra note 35, at 61-62; DiscplinedApproach,
supra note 63, at 513-14.
80. Cf.In re Ryman, 394 Mich. 637, 232 N.W.2d 178 (1975); In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d
317 (Tex. 1974) (prior term doctrine not applicable in judicial disciplinary hearings to prevent
disciplinary action for conduct which occurred without public's knowledge before judge's reelection to office).
81. Accord, In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo.
1978); In re Piper, 534 P.2d 159 (Or. 1975); In re Heuerman, __ S.D. _ 240 N.W.2d 603
(1976).

judicial discipline. The court eloquently expressed this idea in the
following manner:
For generations... it has been taught that a judge must possess
the confidence of the community; that he must not only be independent and honest, but, equally important, believed by all men
to be independent and honest. A cloud of witnesses testify that

"justice must not only be done, it must be seen to be done." Without the appearanceas well as thefact ofijustice, respect for the law
vanishes in a democracy. 82

The ideals embraced in this statement were given little consideration three years later when the supreme court vacated its order suspending Judge Greenberg from judicial office.83 The court
predicated this decision upon a consideration of the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding his criminal trial,8 4 the effusive praise
given the judge by local officials and attorneys, the refusal of the
local bar association to institute disbarment proceedings against
Greenberg, and the receipt of a Presidential pardon by the judge. To
the court, the presence of these factors so greatly minimized the impact of the criminal conviction on the confidence of the public that
reinstating the judge would in no way damage the integrity of the
judiciary.85
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court ignored the existence of the judge's criminal conviction, now final, which had been
the entire basis for initially ordering the suspension. Although the
court continued to emphasize the importance of public trust in the
judiciary, it did not consider the probable view of the private citizen
who would know only of this conviction. Instead, the court gauged
the opinion of the public by the recommendations given Greenberg
by a narrow and select segment of the community.8 6 No mention
82. 442 Pa. 411, 416, 280 A.2d 370, 372 (1972) (emphasis added).
83. In re Greenberg, 457 Pa. 33, 318 A.2d 740 (1974) [hereinafter cited as GreenbergIll].
The suspension order as issued by the court in its earlier decision did not indicate the status of
the disciplinary sanction when the judge had exhausted all appellate remedies, although the
JIRB's recommendation had been to remove the judge if the conviction was upheld. The
supreme court had denied certiorari of the criminal case, United States v. Alper, 449 F.2d 1223
(3d Cir. 1971), at the time of the Greenberg I decision. Greenberg v. United States, 405 U.S.
988 (1972).
84. The elements within this category included the length and intricacy of the trial, the
jury's difficulty in reaching a final decision, the fact that Greenberg was found guilty of only
one of the initial twenty-one charges, and the jury's marks on the jury slip, which had been
altered by the jury before they made their final report to the court. The court also concluded
that Greenberg was convicted due only to his client's misdeeds, a decision which Justice Pomeroy, in his dissent, felt came "perilously close to impunging the fairness of [Greenberg's] trial
and the competence of the appellate review .
457 Pa. 33, at 57, 318 A.2d 740, at 752
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
85. In contrast, Chief Justice Eagen stated, "Reinstatement of Judge Greenberg will not
enhance [the public's] confidence and respect, rather will it serve to increase the cynicism
about the courts and the law now all too prevalent in this nation." Id at 48, 318 A.2d at 798
(Eagen, J., dissenting).
86. In addition to prominent officers and members of the Philadelphia Bar Association,
testimony on Greenberg's integrity and ability was taken from, among others, professors at
both Temple University and the University of Pennsylvania, the Executive Vice-President of a

was made in the decision of the standard of the reasonable or objective private citizen generally utilized in judicial disciplinary proceed87
ings.
The importance afforded by the court to the local bar association's decision not to institute a hearing on the disbarment of Greenberg is misplaced in an action of judicial discipline. Those
jurisdictions that have considered the question have generally ruled
that disbarment proceedings are separate from judicial disciplinary
hearings; the decisions in each respective proceeding should have no
influence on the other. 8 A major premise underlying this separation
of disciplinary procedures is that judges, because they occupy a position in which our society places great trust, must, therefore, be required to adhere to even higher standards of ethics than attorneys.8 9
A judge may be removed from office for conduct which would not be
sufficient to justify his disbarment. 90 Contrasted with these decisions, the court in Greenberg II impliedly posited a standard for
judges that would, in effect, be no more demanding than that placed
upon lawyers in Pennsylvania.
An analysis of the ability of the court in GreenbergII to maintain stricter standards of judicial conduct must also consider the emphasis the court placed upon the judge's receipt of a Presidential
pardon. As stressed by Justice Pomeroy in his dissent, a pardon has
not been held to require the nullification of a disbarment in Pennsylvania, perhaps because the pardon in itself cannot rectify the consequences of the conduct which initially necessitated this sanction.9 '
Ruling, as the court did in GreenbergII, that a Presidential pardon is
of enough significance to warrant reconsideration of judicial discibank victimized by the mail fraud, and former Governor William Scranton. Id at 38-39, 318
A.2d at 742-43.
87. Although the validity of the court's determination of public opinion is subject to
question, there does not exist at present any truly effective means to gauge public confidence in
the judiciary for two reasons. First, defining the "public" whose opinion is of value is difficult
in our mobile and diversified society. See note 69 supra. Second, there is no adequate device
to demonstrate a valid correlation between the misconduct of a particular judge and a loss of
public trust in the courts other than public opinion polls, which are too expensive to be practical. See DisciplinedApproach,supra note 63, at 516-17; 84 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1006.
88. See, e.g., Spruance v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 841, 532 P.2d 1209 (1975); In re Kapcia, 389 Mich. 306, 205 N.W.2d 436 (1973); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972); In re Sisemore, 534 P.2d
167 (Or. 1975).
89. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 308 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32
Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972); In re Piper, 534 P.2d 159 (Or. 1975); In re Douglas,
135 Vt. 585, 382 A.2d 215 (1977).
90. E.g., Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 201 (1973) (judge removed from office for continual obscene and abusive behavior toward attorneys, litigants, and employees could continue to practice law); In re Lamotte, 341
So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1977) (judge removed from office for impermissible use of official air travel
card was not subject to disbarment).
91. 457 Pa. at 59-60, 318 A.2d at 753-54. See Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. 331, 135 A.
732 (1927).

pline, further implies that judges, in certain circumstances, may be
subject to standards of ethics less demanding than those of attorneys.92
The conflict between the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in GreenbergII and the decisions of other state supreme courts
on similar questions of judicial discipline was not apparent in In re
Dandridge.93 In Dandridgethe opinion of the court on the question
of the propriety of a judge's acceptance of gifts is in accordance with
most other jurisdictions. The supreme court accepted the JIRB's recommendation for the private admonishment of a common pleas
judge based upon his alleged acceptance of the proceeds from a testimonial dinner in his behalf. Although Judge Dandridge claimed
this practice was common among judges in the Philadelphia area,
the JIRB determined that such conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and brought the judicial office into disrepute.9 4
In the Dandridge opinion, the court referred specifically to
Canon 295 of the Code, which requires the avoidance of actual or
apparent impropriety in all judicial conduct. The committee that
drafted the Code included this broad and somewhat vague standard
with the intention that it be read in conjunction with each of the
other more specific Canons. In short, although judges are free to
engage in any legal and acceptable conduct, Canon 2 requires that
92. Chief Justice Eagen, in his dissent, was the only justice to consider Greenberg's violation of the suspension order, which had prohibited his "exercise of any and all judicial functions." Greenberg had violated this order by voluntarily performing administrative duties in
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Justice Eagen concluded that this action was in
itself sufficient reason to remove the judge from office. 457 Pa. at 48-49, 318 A.2d at 761
(Eagen, J., dissenting). The majority, however, defined this to be a "non-judicial position,"
and actually considered Greenberg's performance there as a grounds for reinstatement. Id at
38-39, 743.
93. 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975).
94. This phrase, commonly used by disciplinary commissions, has been defined by the
California Supreme Court as, "conduct which a judge undertakes in goodfaith but which
nevertheless would appear to an objective observer to be not only unjudicial conduct but conduct prejudicial to public esteem for the judicial office." (emphasis added). Geiler v. Comm'n
on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 284, 515 P.2d 1, 9, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201, 209 (1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974). Behavior within this category includes willful misconduct
committed in a judge's private life. Id at 283 n.ll, 515 P.2d at 9 n.ll, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 209
n.1 1. "Willful misconduct" is defined as "unjudicial conduct which a judge acting in hisjudicialcapacitycommits in badfath.'"(emphasis added). Id at 284, 515 P.2d at 9, 110 Cal. Rptr.
at 209.
95. Canon 2 provides as follows:
A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearances of impropriety in all his activities.
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at
all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to influence his
judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the prestige of his office to
advance the private interests of others; nor should he convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence him. He
should not testify voluntarily as a character witness..

they must make an additional effort to assure that the public may not
infer improper judicial conduct.9 6 The supreme court followed this
reasoning in Dandridge. While recognizing that the acceptance of a
pecuniary gift is not misconduct per se, 97 the court nevertheless
placed a burden upon the judge to insure that his acceptance be done
in a way which could not reflect negatively upon the integrity and
honesty of the judiciary. 98
The supreme court scrutinized Dandridge's acceptance of the
gift under the objective standard of the average, private citizen. 99
Contrary to the Greenberg II decision, the court ignored the evidence of the judge's exemplary service and outstanding reputation
for judicial integrity. It also accorded no relevance to Dandridge's
testimony that he thought this gift was a common practice in the
96.

See Thode, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 49 (1973) [herein-

after cited as REPORTER'S NOTES). The problems faced by the court in defining the public in a
pluralistic society such as ours are enlarged when the court must further define the values by
which the standards of impropriety will be measured. Moral values and standards of acceptable conduct vary widely among the different societal groups and from one geographic area to
another. Because of this variance in values, it is almost impossible for a disciplinary commission to define standards of proper judicial conduct that will satisfy every societal group. Consequently, even the most efficient commission can only maintain, at most, the confidence of a
majority of the community. See generally DiscplinedApproach, supra note 63, at 514-15.
97. Canon 5(C), which defines the standards under which a judge may conduct his business affairs without impugning the integrity of the judiciary, contains within subsection (4) a
general prohibition against the acceptance of any gift by a judge or a member of his household. Exceptions to this rule, however, are as follows:
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to him; books supplied
by publishers on a complimentary basis for official use; or an invitation to the
judge and his spouse to attend a bar-related function or activity devoted to the
improvement of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice;
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from a relative; a wedding
or engagement gift; a loan from a lending institution in its regular course of
business on the same terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or
a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to other applicants;
(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may accept any
other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor is not a party or other person
whose interests have come or are likely to come before him, and, if its value
exceeds $100, the judge reports it in the same manner as he reports compensation in Canon 6C.
Although a judge may accept these specific types of gifts without fear of violating Canon 5(C),
his acceptance must be done in a way that does not violate the standard of propriety set forth
in Canon 2. See In re Bonin, - Mass. _, 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978); In re Vaccaro, 42 N.Y.2d (e)
(1977); REPORTER'S NOTES, supra note 96, at 83-85. Although the court referred to the commentary to subsection (4) in their decision, Pennsylvania did not adopt this portion of the
Code, a point emphasized by Justice Nix, in his dissent. Nix, J., dissenting, 462 Pa. at 81, 337
A.2d at 892 (Nix, J., dissenting).
98. Whenever judicial conduct involves the exchange of money, either as payment of
court fees and costs or as a gift, compliance with Canon 2 is essential to avoid the appearance
of judicial bribery. The intent of the judge with respect to this exchange is immaterial. See,
e.g., In re Diener, 268 Md. 659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); In re
Larkin, 368 Mass. 87, 333 N.E.2d 199 (1975); In re Morrissey, 366 Mass. 11, 313 N.E.2d 878
(1974); In re Storie, 574 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1978); In re Douglas, 135 Vt. 585, 382 A.2d 215
(1977).
99. See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra.

Philadelphia area" and that he possessed no corrupt motive for accepting the money.' 0 t The court reasoned that the public, without
knowledge of the judge's subjective perception of his conduct, could
view this incident as proof that a supposedly impartial judge could
be improperly influenced by a gift of money. The court ruled that it
was necessary that the judge be admonished and that he return the
money received at the dinner.
Although the maintenance and enhancement of public confidence in the judiciary was the primary consideration of the court in
both Greenberg and Dandridge,this goal was never addressed by the
court in In re Johnson,10 2 the first Pennsylvania disciplinary action to
consider a judge's courtroom conduct. In this case, the supreme
court rejected the JIRB's recommendation for reprimand of a common pleas judge for his alleged violations of Canons 2A 0 3 and
3A(3). t°" The JIRB's charges were based upon the judge's alleged
abuse of judicial powers and his display of an "impatient, undignified, intemperate, and discourteous manner" toward witnesses appearing before him.'
Other jurisdictions that have addressed the question of courtroom misconduct, however, specifically emphasize the public's perception of a judge's courtroom behavior, especially when the
misconduct occurs at the lower court level."°6 Many members of the
general public have their first and, frequently, their only contact with
100. Judge Dandridge claimed his prosecution singled him out as a "scapegoat" for discipline by the JIRB, and that, therefore, his prosecution was discriminatory. The supreme court,
however, found no evidence in the record that the JIRB had ignored reports of such conduct
by other judges, and placed the burden upon the judge to introduce the appropriate evidence.
462 Pa. at 75, 337 A.2d at 889.
101. See note 97 supra.
102. 483 Pa. 227, 395 A.2d 1319 (1978).
103. See note 95 supra
104. Canon 3(A)(3) provides as follows:
A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses,
lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his official capacity, and should require
similar conduct of lawyers, and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his
directions and control.
105.
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL INQUIRY AND
AGAINST LIVINGSTON M. JOHNSON 1.

REVIEW BD., INQUIRY INTO CHARGES

The charges arose out of Judge Johnson's behavior on two separate occasions. On the first
of these, the judge had ordered that a witness, who was not present when called to testify, be
held in custody until the afternoon session of the trial. The witness, an attorney, had left
the
courtroom after checking to assure that he would not be called to testify. When he was subsequently called just before the lunch recess, he was appearing as counsel before another judge
and was not immediately available. When he did appear, the judge placed him in custody for
two and one-half hours.
On the second occasion in question, the judge asked three detectives appearing before him
in a juvenile proceeding about a breach of confidentiality that had occurred in an earlier proceeding. In the course of this questioning, the judge held one detective in contempt of court
for his responses to the judge's query. On both occasions, the JIRB termed the judge's actions
flagrantly injudicious.
106. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 340 So. 2d 301 (La. 1976); In re Deiner, 268 Md. 659, 304
A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); In re Fullwood, 518 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. 1976);
In re Spitalnick, 63 N.J. 429, 308 A.2d 1 (1973).

the courts at this level. From this contact they form a lasting opinion
of the judiciary. Thus, it has been held particularly important that
judges at this level conduct themselves in a manner that conveys the
utmost competence and impartiality. 0 7 In the Johnson case, however, the court refused to discipline the judge, although throughout
its opinion it conceded that more reasonable and appropriate means
of handling
the courtroom proceedings were available to the
08
judge.1
The court's acquiescence in this display of poor judgment in the
courtroom is relevant to the question of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's willingness to apply higher standards of conduct to the judiciary. The court's condonation of the judge's concededly inferior
disposition of these proceedings conflicts with the principle of close
scrutiny of a judge's behavior.0 9 Most states require that a judge
adjudicate matters before him through the most prompt and proper
procedure that is reasonably available." 0 Proper handling of court
proceedings includes the exhibition of a patient and dignified manner to all individuals who appear before a judge in his official capacity."' In the Johnson opinion, the court states that the record
supports the conclusion that both the judge and the witness displayed a discourteous and impatient manner." 2 The inference to be
drawn from this statement is that a judge is entitled to act as does a
witness appearing before him, a conclusion not in accordance with
the application of higher standards of conduct as they are defined by
other jurisdictions. 'I
One final aspect of the Johnson opinion is significant with respect to its implications for judicial discipline in Pennsylvania. In its
opinion, the court emphasized the importance of a judge using the
power of contempt rarely and with great caution since it deprives an
individual of his liberty. Nonetheless, the court went on to rule that
reversible error in the exercise of the contempt power would not in
107. Id
108. 483 Pa. at 238, 239-40, 395 A.2d at 1324, 1325.
109. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra.
110. See Cannon v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 14 Cal. 3d 678, 537 P.2d 898, 122
Cal. Rptr. 788 (1975); In re Dwyer, 223 Kan. 72, 572 P.2d 898 (1977); In re Deiner, 268
Md.659, 304 A.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989 (1974); In re Scott, - Mass. - 386
N.E.2d 218 (1979); In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1976); In re Anderson, 252
N.w.2d 592 (Minn. 1977); In re Crutchfield, 289 N.C. 597, 223 S.E.2d 822 (1975); In re Hardt,
72 N.J. 160, 369 A.2d 5 (1977).
111. See Spruance v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 13 Cal. 3d 778, 532 P.2d 1209,
119 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1975); In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 676 (1975); In re Troy, 364
Mass. 15, 300 N.E.2d 159 (1973); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 256 N.W.2d 727 (1977). "The
poorest, weakest, most helpless or illiterate defendant, standing before an American court, is
entitled to exactly the same respect . . . as the Chief Justice of the United States standing
before the court and similarly accused." In re Yengo, 72 N.J. 405, 448, 371 A.2d 41, 56-57
(1977).
112. 483 Pa. at 240, 395 A.2d at 1326.
113. See cases in notes 110-11 supra.

itself constitute a basis for the imposition of discipline." 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court focused upon the remedy available to
the individual directly injured by a judge's misconduct and overlooked the impact of abuses of judicial powers on the public's respect
for the judiciary. Although the reparation of injury to an individual's rights is of great importance in our system of justice, its availability should not automatically preclude the initiation of disciplinary
action against a judge who abuses his powers of office. Indiscriminate use of the contempt power, or of any other discretionary power
of a judge, will do little to encourage public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.' I
The integrity of the judiciary as affected by the conduct of a
judge in his private life was the issue considered by the court in In re
Dallesandro,116 the most recent Pennsylvania judicial disciplinary
action. The JIRB had recommended the reprimand of a common
pleas judge on the basis of several incidents of alleged misconduct.
These allegations included the acceptance of campaign funds in violation of the election code, active participation in a family automobile dealership in violation of Canon 5C(l)," participation in an
open, meretricious relationship with a woman not his wife in violation of Canons 1118 and 2,119 and the appointment of the woman to2 a
secretarial position in the courthouse in violation of Canon 3B(4).

1

In interpreting the boundaries of Canons 1 and 2, the supreme
court established an important precedent for the discipline of judges
in Pennsylvania. 12 ' Both Canons 1 and 2 define the responsibility of
_ 386 N.E.2d 218 (1979); In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665,
114. But see In re Scott, -Mass.
256 N.W.2d 727 (1977); In re Yengo, 72 N.J. 425, 371 A.2d 41 (1977) (abuse of contempt
power makes judge subject to disciplinary action).
115. Both Justice Roberts and Justice Larsen dissented from the majority decision. Justice
Larsen, in a harshly worded opinion, characterized Judge Johnson as "an ill-tempered, jailhappy" judge, with behavior like that of a bully. Justice Larsen recommended a one month
suspension of the judge from office, with removal pending a lack of improvement in his courtroom behavior. 483 Pa. at 242, 395 A.2d at 1326.
116. 483 Pa. 431, 397 A.2d 743 (1979).
117. Canon 5C(l) provides as follows:
A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial position, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers
or persons likely to come before the court on which he serves.
118. Canon I provides, "A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary."
119. See note 95 supra.
120. Canon 3B outlines the standards for a judge executing his administrative responsibilities. Section (4) provides as follows:
A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should exercise his power
of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoiding nepotism and favoritism. He
should not approve compensation of appointees beyond the fair value of services
rendered.
121. In addition to the court's disposition of the judge's violation of Canons I and 2, the
court held that the evidence was far short of the clear and convincing evidence needed to
impose discipline for the other alleged acts of misconduct. It held that the violations of the
election code were actually the permissible repayment of a loan made by the judge to the

a judge to avoid the fact or the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. Canons 1 and 2 have been interpreted in other jurisdictions to authorize the scrutiny of a judge's conduct while he is both
on and off the bench, whenever this conduct gives rise to questions of
impropriety. 12 Pennsylvania had adopted this interpretation in
Greenberg and Dandridge,which concerned conduct of a judge acting in other than his official capacity. 2 3 In Dallesandro, however,
the court limited disciplinary scrutiny of private conduct to only
those actions that are prohibited by law.
The court analyzed the applicable constitutional provisions and
Canons 1 and 2 and found no justification in any of these for the
imposition of discipline for private conduct of a judge other than
that prohibited by article 5, section 17(b) of the Pennsylvania constitution. 2 4 In its analysis, however, the supreme court separated the
individual judge and the judicial office in a line of reasoning unlike
that followed in any other jurisdiction. The court focused upon the
use of the terms "judicial" and "judiciary" in the constitution and
the Code, and concluded that the use of such terms indicated a concern with only the official conduct of a judge. This strict interpretation, however, completely ignores the use of the phrase "all his
activities" in Canon 2. Clearly, this phrase extends the scope of Canon 2 to private conduct, an interpretation given it by all other jurisdictions that have considered the issue. These courts have realized
the possibility of private conduct reflecting adversely
upon the pub25
judiciary.
the
of
integrity
the
of
lic's perception
The opinion of the supreme court stressed the constitutional implications of the state's enforcement of private moral beliefs and acceptable standards of conduct through the JIRB. A fear that this
family business. The judge's participation in this business was ruled to be within the boundaries of Canon 5C(l) upon the evidence presented. Participation in a family business is expressly permitted by an addendum to the Code as long as the standards of 5C(l) are met. In
this case, the judge had used dealer's plates on his car, had attended one car dealers' meeting
and had been photographed with other dealers, and was present at the dealership at night
although he never dealt directly with the customers. But ef. In re Scott, - Mass. _ 386
N.E.2d 218 (1979) (evidence of minimal participation in a family business warrants reprimand). Finally, the court rejected the charge that the judge violated Canon 3B(4), first, for
lack of evidence that the judge had acted contrary to any established procedure for appointment and second, for lack of evidence that the appointment was based on anything but merit.
But cf.In re Bonin, - Mass. - 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978) (merit appointment of a prior client's
secretary presented appearance of impropriety).
122. See In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303 (Alas. 1975); Geiler v. Comm'n on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal. 3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); In
re Lee, 336 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1976); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469 (1970); In re
Foster, 271 Md. 449, 318 A.2d 523 (1974); In re Bonin, - Mass. _ 378 N.E.2d 669 (1978); In
re Bennett, 403 Mich. 178, 267 N.W.2d 914 (1978); In re Duncan, 541 S.w.2d 564 (Mo. 1976);
Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972). See also McKay,
The Judiciary and Nonjid'cialActiviies, 35 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1970).
123. See notes 78-80 and 93-96 and accompanying text supra
124. See note 55 supra
125. See cases in note 122 supra

action might unreasonably infringe upon a judge's individual constitutional rights underlines the court's reasoning in this area. The
question of the degree to which a state, through its method of judicial discipline, may infringe upon a judge's rights has been previously considered. The state has been recognized to have a
compelling interest in maintaining judicial integrity and avoiding actual or apparent impropriety. 26 The state may impose disciplinary
limitations' 2 7 but these limitations must be reasonably related to the
protection of the state's interest. 128
Within this analytical framework, states have been permitted to
limit a judge's freedom of speech,' 29 right of privacy, 130 and right of
association. 13 ' Furthermore, in none of these cases was the conduct
in question of a criminal or unlawful nature. The infringement was
instead justified upon the necessity of avoiding the appearance of
impropriety among the judiciary. The court in Dallesandro, however, excluded the judge's extra-marital relationship from the scope
of its review, and thus, did not consider whether this relationship
presented the appearance of impropriety. Similar fact situations in
126. See Friedman v. Court on the Judiciary of New York, 375 U.S. 10 (1963); Napolitano v. Ward, 457 F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1037 (1972); Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 438 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. La. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 944 (1978); Roy v.
Jones, 349 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
127. The courts have held that the privilege of holding judicial office is derived from a
state's constitution and statutes. The state creates the judicial office and, therefore, it can set
standards of conduct for the individual occupying that office. No provision in the United
States Constitution mandates that a state permit a judge to hold office unhampered by standards of conduct, nor is there any guarantee of a right or privilege to run for or retain state
elective judicial office. See Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943); Napolitano v. Ward, 457
F.2d 279 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1037 (1972); Greenberg v. Kavanaugh, 413 F.
Supp. 1132 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Peterson v. Knutson, 367 F. Supp. 515 (D. Minn. 1973). But f
Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 438 F. Supp. 599 (E.D. La. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S.
944 (1978) (individual possesses a right to run for political office).
128. For example, a state statute that required a judge to resign from office before becoming a candidate for a nonjudicial elective office was declared an unreasonable means of effectuating the state's protection of judicial integrity. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of La., 438 F.
Supp. 599 (E.D. La. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 944 (1978). The regulation in Aorial was
intended to promote compliance with Canon 7A(3), which provides, as follows: "A judge
should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either in a party primary or in a general
election for a nonjudicial office.
... For an analysis of the effect of this decision on the
validity of the Code in general, see Woodward, W'hat the MorAi7 DecisionMeans, 61 JUD. 422
(1978).

129. See Halleck v. Berliner, 427 F. Supp. 1225 (D.D.C. 1977) (judge criticized, in his
courtroom, other members of the judiciary, subjected litigants, attorneys and witnesses to harassment and ridicule; and made irrelevant personal inquiries into the sexual conduct and attitudes of individuals appearing before him); In re Rome, 218 Kan. 198, 542 P.2d 676 (1975)
(judge wrote a memorandum decision in poetic form which ridiculed the defendant who was
before him on charges of prostitution). Both cases ruled that the free speech of a judge in the
courtroom has certain boundaries that, if violated, may subject him to disciplinary action.
130. See In re Lee, 336 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1976); In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469
(1970); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972).
131. A judge is entitled to and may assert rights of association but these rights are subject
to appropriate limits in their exercise in the context of official duties and functions. In re
Bonin, - Mass. _ 378 N.E.2d 669, 684 (1978). See In re Haggerty, 257 La. 1, 241 So. 2d 469
(1970); In re Vaccaro, 42 N.Y.2d (e) (1977); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d
214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972).

other jurisdictions, however, have been held to present such an ap32
pearance.1
The ability of the JIRB to encourage public respect in the judicial system must be seriously questioned in light of the supreme
court's treatment of recommendations in these cases.' 33 Definitive
guidelines for acceptable judicial conduct have not yet been established, for the supreme court has continually wavered in its adherence to any one line of reasoning. Without these guidelines, the
ability of the JIRB to deter future misconduct remains uncertain.
Most important, public confidence in the
integrity of the Penn134
maintained.
been
not
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courts
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V.

Alternatives for the Improvements of the System

The real question in analyzing the effectiveness of the commission plan in Pennsylvania centers upon the judiciary's capability for
self-regulation. Can the attainment of public confidence be reconciled with a disciplinary system completely within the control of the
judiciary? 135 This question is certainly not unique to Pennsylvania.
132. In re Lee, 336 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 1976) (engaging in sexual intercourse in a parked car
with a woman not his wife gave to judicial conduct an appearance of impropriety); Cincinnati
Bar Ass'n v. Heitzler, 32 Ohio St. 2d 214, 291 N.E.2d 477 (1972) (appearances of impropriety
arose from judge's overnight trip with an unmarried woman).
133. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's promotion of respect in the judiciary has also
been hampered by their decisions in two cases which challenged the Code through appellate
review. In Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570, 381 A.2d 421 (1977), the supreme court allowed a judge
to continue to practice law until the settlement of his contested election despite the fact that the
Code, Canon 5F, and article 4, § 17 expressly prohibit such judicial behavior and that the
judge's term of office had commenced. In addition, the court ruled that the judge was entitled
to compensation during this period in which he practiced law. But cf In re Piper, 534 P.2d 159
(Or. 1975) (judge reprimanded for completing the settlement of estates that had begun prior to
his ascension to the bench). In his dissent, Justice Pomeroy likened this situation to the facts in
In re Dandridge, 462 Pa. 67, 337 A.2d 885 (1975). He argued that allowing a judge to be
compensated for duties not fulfilled, even though through no fault of the judge, presented an
appearance of impropriety which eroded public respect for the judiciary. 475 Pa. at 588, 381
A.2d at 430 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
In Commonwealth v. Perry, 468 Pa. 515, 364 A.2d 312 (1976), the court upheld the decision of a common pleas judge not to disqualify himself from the trial of a defendant charged
with the murder of an individual with whom the judge was acquainted and whose funeral he
had attended. The supreme court ruled that the judge's relationship with the victim did not
affect his ability to preside impartially in the case, as required by Canon 3C(l), even though as
Justice Roberts emphasized in the dissent, this same relationship would have been grounds for
the dismissal of a possible juror. 468 Pa. at 531, 364 A.2d at 376 (Roberts, J., dissenting). But
cf Savage v. Savage, 238 Ga. 16, 230 S.E.2d 851 (1976); State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa
1976) (a judge shall recuse himself whenever his impartiality may reasonably be questioned).
134. Following the supreme court's decision in Dallesandro, a number of editorials highly
critical of the courts were published in major Pennsylvania newspapers. Philadelphia Inquirer, January 17, 1979, § A at 8, col. 3; Wilkes-Barre Times Leader, January 19, 1979, § A at
4, col. 1; Erie Times-News, January 28, 1979, § B at 2, col. 5.
135. The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently gave what some may consider to be a
negative answer to this question in Armor v. Armor, -. Pa. Super. Ct. _ 398 A.2d 173 (1978).
In Armor the court held that no judge within the same district could properly decide a child
support action in which the mother had been remarried to a member of the bench of that
district. In the opinion of the court, the participation of a judge in such a procedure, even
absent any showing of bias or prejudice, would be contrary to the appearance of integrity and
independence of the judiciary and would violate Canons I and 2.

A minority of other jurisdictions have attempted to resolve this conflict by modifying the structure of their disciplinary systems to
achieve some separation from the state court system.
A.

Bifurcated Systems

As its name implies, the bifurcated or "two-tier" system, divides
the investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative responsibilities between two independent administrative agencies. As utilized in Illinois,136 one of these agencies, the Judicial Inquiry Board (JIB),137 is
given the responsibility of investigating and prosecuting allegations
of misconduct. 38 If the JIB concludes that a reasonable basis for the
complaint does exist, it then recommends disciplinary action to the
second agency, the Courts Commission.' 39 The Commission, comprised of five judges, considers the JIB's recommendation under procedures similar to those followed in Pennsylvania by the supreme
court."4 The Commission then makes a final decision on the matter
14 1
which is not reviewable by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Other states have adopted a bifurcated system similar to that of
Illinois, but with several important distinctions. 42 For example, Alabama's system consists of a Judicial Inquiry Commission 43 and a
Court of the Judiciary.'4 The Commission is authorized only to investigate allegations of judicial misconduct. 145 If it finds that a reasonable basis for the allegation exists, it then files a formal complaint
with the court.'" Unlike the JIRB, the Commission conducts no
formal hearings itself, nor does it recommend disciplinary sanctions
to the court. 147 The Court of the Judiciary decides, upon the merits
148
of the case, the necessity of imposing a sanction upon the judge.
This decision is final but the judge may request its review by the
state supreme court, which is limited to an appellate review of the
49
record of the proceedings on the law and facts. 1
136.

ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 15.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id § 15(b).
Id § 15(c).
Id
IUI.Const. of 1970, art. VI, § 15(c).
Id See generaly BRAITHWAITE, supra note 5, at 96-116; Greenberg, The Illinois

"Two-Tier" JudicialDiscoplinarySyster

Five Years and Counting, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 69

(1977).
142. See ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17-18; DEL. CONST. art. V, § 37; OKLA. CONST. art.
7-A, §§ 1-7.
143.

ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.17.

144.

Id § 6.18.

145.
146.

Id
Id

147.
148.
149.

§ 6.17.

Id
Id § 6.18.
Id See generally Cole, Discioline, Removal, or Exoneration of Alabama Jurists, 5
CUM.-SAM. L. REV. 214 (1974); Cole, Judicial Inquiry Commission" Successor to the Judicial
Commission ofAlabama, 35 ALA. L. REV. 289 (1974).

Although the bifurcated system has been used successfully in
these jurisdictions, the American Bar Association does not recommend that this system be established as a method of judicial discipline. 5 This recommendation is based upon the fact that the
bifurcated system may be time-consuming and costly, and it often
requires the unnecessary duplication of evidence. However, this system does have the undeniable advantage of separation from the
state's court system. In addition it affords greater due process protection to the judge."5 '
B.

One-Tier Commission

New York recently established a unique "one-tier" commission
system to replace its original bifurcated system.' 5 2 The Commission
on Judicial Conduct, comprised of judges, lawyers, and laypersons,
is authorized to investigate, adjudicate, and impose sanctions for judicial misconduct.' 5 3 The decision of the Commission may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals if the judge so desires.' 5 4 This
system has the advantage of operating independently of the state
court system, while avoiding the added costs of the bifurcated system's duplicated hearings. New York's one-tier commission, however, presents due process questions since the merger of
prosecutional and adjudicative functions in the Commission is not
balanced by a higher court's automatic, unqualified consideration, as
in Pennsylvania.
C. Permanent Investigative Office
Another method of judicial discipline, which has been implemented in New Jersey, is the authorization of the state's highest
court, through its administrative office, to discipline or remove
judges for their misconduct. 55 This system is based upon the
supreme court's possession of inherent disciplinary powers' 56 that
have subsequently been expressly authorized by statute. 1 57 Under
this system, the court's Administrative Office investigates complaints
of misconduct and conducts independent examinations of the courts'
150. ABA PROPOSED STANDARDS, No. 1.5.
151. See Developing Standards,supra note 9, at 704-06.
152. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22. The change in the New York method of judicial discipline
was considered necessary due to the unusual size and structure of the state court system. See
generally Stem, New York'r Approach to JudicialDiscpline: The Development of a Commission
System, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 137 (1977).
153. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 22.
154. Id Although the court of appeals may review the record of the proceedings on the
law and facts, the New York Commission is considered separate from the state court system
since the decision of the commission may be final, unlike the JIRB's recommendation.
155. See N.J. CONsT. art. 11, § 6, 4.
156. See note 59 supra
157. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:IB-2 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).

proceedings and records. 15 8 The results of these investigations are
then submitted to the chief justice, with recommendations for corrective measures as warranted. 59 If the supreme court considers it nec60
essary, formal proceedings will be instituted against the judge.
These proceedings are conducted by the supreme court sitting en
6
banc or by three judges or justices assigned by the chief justice.' '
beyond a reaThe judge may be disciplined if the evidence indicates 62
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The advantages to this system rest upon the permanance and
visibility of the Administrative Office and its ability to continually
monitor areas of potential misconduct. 63 Critics of this system argue, however, that it is only functional in compact states with relatively small court systems.' 64
D.

Other Suggestions

In addition to the implementation of one of these structural
modifications, the effectiveness of the JIRB would be increased by
the establishment of consistent definitional bases for the standards of
judicial conduct. An elucidation of the specific types of unacceptable conduct would assist judges making individual decisions upon
the propriety of their contemplated actions. Clearer explanations of
the existing grounds of misconduct in the opinions of the supreme
court would assist these decisions. Further certainty in definition
would also result if the supreme court would consider the precedents
of other jurisdictions on similar types of judicial misconduct. 165
VI.

Conclusion

The existence of an effective and vital judiciary requires the balancing of judicial independence and judicial legitimacy. The disciplinary commission, at present, is the optimal procedure by which
this balance can be maintained. The independence of the judiciary
is protected from external pressures through the self-regulatory process of the commission. At the same time, public confidence and respect for the judicial system, the foundation of its legitimacy, are
158. Id § 2A:12-3 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
159. Id
160. Id § 2A:IB-6.
161. Id § 2A:IB-7.
162. Id § 2A:IB-9.
163. See Braithwaite, supra note 5, at 55; Developing Standards, supra note 9, at 691.
164. See, e.g., THE JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 183; Frankel, supra note 15, at 1125.
165. One of the obstacles to the effective operation of the disciplinary commission in general is the isolation of each state's procedure. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the
American Judicature Society established the Center for Judicial Conduct Organizations to act
as a clearinghouse for disciplinary mechanisms nationwide. The Center will catalogue the
disciplinary decisions of each state and provide consultation and reference services. See generally The Centerfor Judicial Conduct Organizations, 61 JUD. 205 (1978).

promoted by the judiciary's willingness to impose sanctions upon its
members whose conduct has and may erode the integrity of the judicial system.
As utilized in Pennsylvania, however, the disciplinary commission system has failed to strike the necessary balance of judicial independence and legitimacy. Instead, the independence of the
judiciary has been protected at the expense of its legitimacy. The
unwillingness of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to discipline
members of the state judiciary, as revealed by its treatment of the
recommendations of the JIRB, subverts the public's confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the Pennsylvania court system. The
disciplinary decisions of the supreme court have also failed to provide guidelines for acceptable judicial conduct which would thereby
deter future misconduct and prevent further erosion of the public's
faith in the judiciary.
A solution to this problem, however, could be achieved through
a restructuring of the commission system as it currently exists in
Pennsylvania. The separation of the JIRB from the state court system, through the implementation of a bifurcated system similar to
that adopted in Illinois, would be the first step in this process. The
establishment of more definite standards of conduct and a consistent
adherence to these standards by the court, or the agency replacing it
in a bifurcated system, would be the second step in the creation of a
more viable process of judicial discipline.
The reputation and integrity of the Pennsylvania judiciary ultimately rests in its supreme court. Unless the supreme court exhibits
a greater willingness to protect the integrity of the courts through the
imposition of appropriate sanctions upon judges for their misconduct, the implementation of a structural alteration to separate the
JIRB from the state court system is essential to the integrity of that
system.
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